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Payday Loan Prohibitions: Protecting
Financially Challenged Consumers or
Pushing Them over the Edge?
William M. Webster, IV*
Abstract
As recovery from the economic downturn continues, American
consumers face an unabated need for short-term, small-dollar
credit. To cope with this need, millions choose to take out payday
loans. Often the subject of controversy and criticism, these loans
have become a mainstream credit option, considered by consumers
alongside so-called “traditional” credit products offered by banks
and credit unions.
This article examines the issues surrounding payday loans,
including consumer credit needs, critical options for fulfilling
those needs and consumer rationale, from the perspective of
Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc., the country’s
largest non-bank provider of cash advance services.
When faced with a need for short-term credit, consumers
weigh all of their options, including those offered by banks, credit
unions, and retail lenders. For example, they compare the
economic and personal costs associated with options such as
overdraft protection fees, the few available bank and credit union
advance products and payday loans, as well as fees for late
payment or utilities reconnection.
For many consumers, a payday loan from a regulated lender
such as Advance America can often be the most affordable
financial service available to them when they need it; our company
offers low-cost, transparent, and convenient credit with
meaningful consumer protections.
However, misconceptions abound. Criticism about the high
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) stems from a fundamental
misunderstanding of payday loans, which charge a one-time, flat
*
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fee (typically, $15 per $100 borrowed)—not interest. Similarly,
payday loans provide a critical credit option for those coping with
urgent, unbudgeted expenses; they do not create additional
financial burdens for consumers. These individuals would
undoubtedly be worse off without access to credit.
As Americans’ credit needs evolve, efforts to restrict access to
payday loans and other short-term lending threaten consumer
interests. While any form of credit can be abused or misused, wellregulated, transparent services such as payday loans offer
consumers a sound choice and effective financial tool for
managing short-term financial needs. American consumers
depend upon a variety of credit options to meet their diverse needs
and expenses. Regulators, consumer groups, and leaders within
the financial services industry must collaborate to maintain a
wide array of credit offerings and to foster the development of
innovative services benefiting the full breadth of consumers.
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I. Introduction
As the United States seeks to recover from a stubborn
economic downturn—with progress that seems to ebb and flow—
millions of Americans continue to experience difficulty making
ends meet. Americans increasingly turn to providers of shortterm credit for assistance in covering basic expenses, as well as
unexpected costs that overwhelm already-stretched budgets.
Their credit options may include “traditional” forms of credit,
such as bank and credit union loans, and “alternative” financial
offerings, such as overdraft protection services and various retail
lending services.
Payday loans are one such retail option available to these
consumers, though they are not without controversy.1 Consumer
activist organizations, in particular, often focus on the implied
interest rates associated with the service and question the
consumer rationale for short-term lending.2 Yet, independent
research shows, as does the industry’s extensive data and
experience, that lenders charge competitive fees for their services,
and—it is critical to note—customers who understand their loans’
terms and pricing typically exhibit a reasoned approach to
selecting them and consider payday loans to be a valuable and
cost-effective service.3
1. “Payday loans” are often referred to as “payday advances” and “cash
advances,” and in this Article these terms will be used interchangeably.
2. See, e.g., Ted Griffith, Industry News: County Bank Cuts ‘Payday’ Ties;
High-Interest Loans Had Long Been Under Fire, NEWS J. (2010),
http://www.aaapaydaycash.com/news_release_11.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2012)
(“Activists criticize the loans for their ‘sky-high’ interest rates, which they say
can approach 1,000 percent on an annualized basis.”) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Connie Gekler, Payday Loans are a Valuable Option for Many:
Letters, NOLA.COM (Sept. 11, 2011 1:23 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.
ssf/2011/09/payday_loans_are_a_valuable_op.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2012)
(explaining that Advance America “customers understand the costs associated
with [its] service and choose a payday advance because it makes personal and
economic sense [and that] . . . payday advances provide many hard-working
families with a valuable option for managing unexpected and periodic financial
difficulties”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Payday LoansQuick and Timely Funding!, YOURPRIVATELOAN.COM (2010), http://yourprivate
loan.com/Payday-Loans-Quick-and-timely-funding!.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2012) (“Loads of companies have started to give away loans at competitive
prices.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
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How are misperceptions shaped between critics’ allegations,
on the one hand, and actual loan pricing and what consumers
decide in the real world, on the other? If critics could prevent
lenders from offering payday loans, would they in fact be acting
in the best interests of those who use these loans, or would they
instead be eliminating a reliable option for these consumers,
ultimately forcing them to choose more costly or less regulated
alternatives?
This Article will examine these issues from the perspective of
Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc. (Advance
America), the country’s largest non-bank provider of cash
advance services, with over 2,500 centers in twenty-nine states.4
In 2011, Advance America extended nearly $4 billion in credit to
more than 1.3 million Americans.5
The periodic needs of millions of consumers for short-term,
small-dollar credit will be highlighted, as will their options for
obtaining such credit. This Article will also rebut two primary
arguments critics make against this industry, specifically the
allegations that (1) payday advances are offered at unreasonably
high rates, and that (2) these loans cause most customers to sink
into a hopeless “cycle of debt,” so to speak.6 Through an
exploration of consumers’ needs and rationale, this Article will
explain that payday advances are often a consumer’s least
expensive and best available credit alternative—one that
consumers would be worse off without.
4. See Advance America, Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ending December 31,
2011 4–5 (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/down
loads/AEA/1749886924x0x555383/DFF29D33-F8BF-4C90-B7E7-44E8682E4988/
SEC-AEA-1047469-12-2758_2011_Form10K_15MAR2012.pdf. On February 15,
2012, the company entered into a merger agreement with Mexico’s Grupo
Elektra S.A. de C.V. See id. at 4. If approved, Advance America will become a
wholly owned subsidiary of Grupo Elektra. See id. at 21.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Critics have made numerous attacks on the payday lending industry. It
is well beyond the scope of this Article to respond to all of them. Instead, it will
focus on the two allegations that appear to have been their core contentions.
See, e.g., LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, LEA A. PLUNKETT & CAROLYN CARTER, NAT.
CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT
WORK, ONES THAT DON’T 3 (June 2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-trap.pdf
(“Payday
loans are very high-cost, short-term loans that ensnare borrowers in a debt
trap.”).
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II. Consumers’ Need for Small-Dollar, Short-Term Credit Options
Any discussion of payday lending must be put in the context
of the credit needs of American families. Millions of consumers
periodically need small-dollar, short-term credit extensions to
help them deal with unexpected or unbudgeted expenses. A
variety of independent studies and reports extensively document
such credit needs, including:
•

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) issued a widely noted report in December
of 2009 which found that about 7.7% of U.S.
households, approximately 9 million individuals,
were “unbanked,” and approximately another
17.9%, about 21 million individuals, were
“underbanked.”7 Thus, over 25% of all American
households, representing approximately 60 million
adults, were in these “underserved” categories in
2009.8 Not surprisingly, given the continued
stagnation of our economy, high unemployment,
and ongoing mortgage crisis, this already large
number appears to be growing.9

•

Also in December of 2009, the FINRA Investor
Education Foundation published the results of

7. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT’L SURVEY OF UNBANKED & UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 10 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter FDIC SURVEY], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/full_report.pdf. The FDIC defined “unbanked”
to mean that no one in the household currently had a checking or savings account
and defined “underbanked” essentially as households that had a checking or savings
account but still relied periodically on alternative financial services such as payday
loans or pawn shops. Id. at 15. In this Article, the term “financially challenged”
consumers will be used to refer collectively to both unbanked and underbanked
consumers, including more affluent middle and higher income consumers who
nonetheless cannot qualify for unsecured personal loans from traditional banks due
to their high debt, their low disposable income levels, and typically their impaired
credit history. It should be recognized that payday lenders do not serve the
unbanked segment of this market because all payday loan customers must have a
bank account.
8. Id. at 10–11.
9. See David Morrison, Interchange Cap Likely Leading To More Unbanked
Americans, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.cutimes.
com/2011/01/28/interchange-cap-likely-leading-to-more-unbanked-americans (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“The number of Americans who have bank accounts is likely
to drop in the coming months as financial institutions seek to make up the costs of
additional regulation with greater fees.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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the first survey in its National Financial
Capability Study, which contains many troubling
findings indicating that a very large percentage of
our population has serious and often ongoing
financial concerns.10 Among other things, nearly
half of those surveyed reported difficulties in
paying bills and meeting monthly expenses.11 The
second and broader survey in this study was
released in December of 2010 and found that 55%
of Americans either spent more than or about
equal to their household income and were thus
living paycheck to paycheck.12 Moreover, the study
reported that 60% of Americans did not have
adequate funds available to cover unanticipated
financial emergencies and that nearly 25%
periodically used alternative financial products
from nondepository financial firms.13
•

KPMG LLP, the internationally respected audit,
tax, and advisory firm, recently reported that its
latest analysis of this financially challenged
market segment shows that it now includes about
88 million individuals, and an additional 6 million
people may join these ranks in the next two
years.14 This report also “indicates that the
underserved market is growing quickly because
millions of wage-earning adults are unfortunately

10. FINRA INVESTOR ED. FOUND., INITIAL REPORT OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY: A COMPONENT OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL
CAPABILITY STUDY (2009), available at http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/

groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/foundation/p120536.pdf.
11. Id. at 15.
12. See FINRA Investor Ed. Found., Financial Capability Study (2011),
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/geo.php?id=National (last visited Apr. 5,
2012) (noting that “20% of individuals reported that over the past year, their
household spent more than their income”, and that 35% “spen[t] about the same
as their income”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Id.
14. Press Release, KPMG LLC, KPMG Study: “Underserved” Market
Represents Opportunity for Banks (June 6, 2011), http://www.kpmg.com/US/
en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Press-Releases/Pages/UnderservedMarket-Represents-Opportunity-For-Banks.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review). KPMG’s report used what appear to
be similar groupings for “unbanked” and “underbanked” consumers, defining the
first group as those without a transaction account and the latter as “those
without access to incremental credit.” Id.
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moving from the ‘average’ credit score to the
‘damaged’ credit score due to negative events.”15
•

FICO credit scores of 25.5% of all U.S. consumers
are below 600, a level where it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for most to obtain unsecured personal
loans from traditional banking institutions.16 Of
particular note is the fact that many middle-class
consumers’ credit ratings have deteriorated and,
like many with lower incomes, these consumers
cannot qualify for bank loans.17

•

A new 2011 study released by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) also presents a
disturbing picture of many American households’
“financial fragility.”18 This study found that almost
half of all households, including a sizable portion of
solidly middle-class families, reported that they
could “probably not” or “certainly not” come up
with just $2,000 to deal with an ordinary financial
shock of that size, even if given thirty days to do
so.19 The findings were not unique to low-income
populations. Roughly 25% of households with an
annual income over $100,000 said they would not
be able to cope with such an expense.20

•

Another report from the National Foundation for
Credit Counseling (NFCC) concluded that to pay
for an unplanned expense of $1,000, instead of
being able to rely on savings, 64% of Americans

15. Id.
16. Press Release, Fair Isaac Corp., FICO Scores Drift Down as Economic
Factors Weigh on Consumer Credit Risk (July 13, 2010), http://www.fico.com/en/
Company/News/Pages/07-13-10.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Low Credit Scores Hobble Prospective Homebuyers, CHICAGO AGENT
MAGAZINE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://chicagoagentmagazine.com/low-credit-scoreshobble-prospective-homebuyers/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (“There were many
outcomes of the housing boom and bust cycle, but one of the more implicit has
been lowering consumer credit scores, a detail that has posed problems for
prospective homebuyers seeking a mortgage for their transactions.”) (on file
with Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Annamaria Lusardi, Daniel J. Schneider & Peter Tufano, Financially
Fragile Households: Evidence and Implications 2 (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 17072), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
conferences/lusardi.pdf.
19. Id. at 3, 10.
20. Id. at 12.
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would have to seek out credit elsewhere, such as
borrowing from friends or family, securing a cash
advance on credit cards, selling or pawning their
assets, securing a small loan from a nondepository
financial institution, or disregarding other
monthly expenses.21

Recent federal financial services regulations, such as the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act22
of 2010, have further exacerbated these needs. Such regulatory
measures have led banks to increase fees and qualification
requirements for their services, pushing many financially
challenged consumers out of traditional financial institutions,
and new restrictions on other forms of credit have further
constricted the marketplace.23 Indeed, the amount of consumer
credit available to Americans in the first seven months of 2011
decreased to $436 billion from $805 billion extended during the
same period in 2006.24
The perspectives of payday lenders—through day-to-day
experiences serving customers—confirm that a large segment of
American households are indeed “financially fragile,” living at the
margin of their disposable incomes.25 Faced with the rising cost of
gas and high food prices,26 along with declining personal
21. Press Release, Nat’l Found. for Credit Counseling, Majority of
Americans Do Not Have Money Available To Meet An Unplanned Expense (Aug.
2011) [hereinafter NFCC], http://www.nfcc.org/NewsRoom/newsreleases/FLOI_
July2011Results_FINAL.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
22. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.) (2011)
(making significant changes to financial regulation and supervision).
23. See Editorial, Thank Dodd–Frank for That Fee, INVESTORS BUS. DAILY,
Oct. 3, 2011, at A16 (“BofA says it stands to lose $2 billion from the arbitrary
Durbin price-fixing amendment and now has no choice but to make up for the
lost revenue some other way.”).
24. Press Release, Equifax, Inc., Total Outstanding Consumer Debt Now
Nearly Equivalent to Pre-Recession Levels (Nov. 2, 2011), available at
http://news.equifax.com/index.php?s=18010&item=96820.
25. Lusardi et al., supra note 18, at 2.
26. See US Consumer Prices Rise by Most in 10 Months Because of Higher
Gas Costs; Core Inflation Tame, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2012
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-consumer-prices-rise-by-mostin-10-months-because-of-higher-gas-costs-core-inflation-tame/2012/03/16/gQAf80DG

PAYDAY LOAN PROHIBITIONS

1059

savings,27 these consumers periodically need short-term, smalldollar loans to cope with unexpected or unplanned expenses.28
These expenses typically involve medical bills, home and
automobile repairs, as well as basic household costs such as
utility and credit card bills.29 Consumers also seek to avoid costly
consequences of missing bill payments, including fees associated
with reconnecting utilities and checking account overdrafts or
late payments on credit cards.30 Consumers in these situations
seek viable avenues for overcoming their financial shortfalls and
avoiding related punitive consequences and may consider such
services as small-dollar bank and credit union loans (when
available), overdraft programs, credit cards, cash advances, and
pawn and car title loans.
III. Financially Challenged Consumers’ Credit Choices
A. Availability of Small, Short-Term Personal Loans from
Traditional Banks
Before discussing payday advances and other alternative
credit options, this Article will examine what choices financially
challenged consumers have for obtaining small, unsecured
personal loans from traditional banks.

S_story.html (“A sharp jump in gas prices drove a measure of U.S.
consumer costs up in February. . . . Grocery store prices appear to be
leveling off after increasing for most of the past two years.”) (last visited
Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See David Reilly, Declining Savings Augurs Ill for Consumers, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 23, 2011, at C1. (“But that willingness to shop as the wider world drops
has come at a cost—a sharp decrease in the savings rate, which is personal
savings as a percentage of disposable personal income. That has shown a steady
decline to 3.6% in September from 5.8% in June 2010.)
28. See Short-Term Credit Alternatives, CONSUMER RIGHTS COALITION,
http://consumerrightscoalition.org/useful-resources/short-term-credit-alternative
s/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (explaining that “[m]any hard working Americans
chose to take out a payday loan, a small, unsecured, short-term cash advance”)
(on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See id. (noting that expenses arise from cars breaking down, medical
needs, appliances breaking, “bounced-check and overdraft protection fees, [and]
late bill payment penalties”).
30. Id.
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When a financially challenged consumer who has an
established relationship with a bank, such as a checking or
savings account, needs to obtain such a loan, logically they might
seek to obtain it from their bank. What loan choices will the bank
most likely offer? The short answer in most cases appears to be
“none.”31 This is not meant as a criticism of banks because banks
appear to have understandable and legitimate business reasons
for such decisions.
Kelly Edmiston, a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
senior economist, has recently noted that, even when banks offer
small personal loans, most financially challenged consumers
cannot qualify for them:
Clearly, if access to a traditional lender such as a bank is
available, most would-be payday borrowers would be better off
seeking short-term funds there. But few banks make smalldollar loans. Even if they did, few typical payday loan
borrowers would have sufficient credit standing to acquire
such a loan.32

For a number of years, banks and credit unions have met their
customers’ needs for short-term credit through services such as
overdraft protection, nonsufficient funds (NSF) transactions, and
credit cards. In fact, “credit cards and other revolving debt plans”
offered by banking institutions amount to $617.7 billion
outstanding in the United States as of June 20, 2011, and now
account for by far the largest share of unsecured consumer
31. Some smaller community banks reportedly still make some smalldollar, unsecured personal loans, but the number and total dollar amount of
such loans is not readily available. See An Examination of the Availability of
Credit for Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Insts. & Consumer
Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 5–6 (2011) (statement of
Barry Wides, Dep. Comptroller for Cmty. Affairs, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency) [hereinafter Wides], available at http://financialservices.
house.gov/Uploaded Files/092211wides.pdf (“Some banks no longer offer
unsecured consumer loans.”); see also, Laura Bruce, Banks Experiment with
Small Loans, BANKRATE.COM (2012), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/personalfinance/ banks-experiment-with-small-dollar-loans-1.aspx (last visited Apr. 5,
2012) (“To be sure, there are many banks across the country that make smalldollar loans[,] . . . [b]ut by and large, banks have shied away from small loans as
it can be difficult to make them profitable.”) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
32. Kelley D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt
Consumers?, THE ECON. REV., First Quarter 2011, at 71, available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/11q1Edmiston.pdf.
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lending.33 However, many federally insured depositories have
been reluctant to enter the small personal loan market.34 In
particular, the majority of banks do not make small loans (e.g.,
$300–$500) to higher-risk consumers because banks’ operating
costs tend to be relatively high, and it is very difficult for most
banks to make such loans on a profitable, economically viable
basis unless they charge high rates.35 Charging high rates
exposes banks to unwanted reputational risks, as critics would
make similar arguments against such services as those made
against traditional payday loans. Banks and credit unions that
offer short-term, cash advance services that are similar to
traditional payday loans generally charge relatively high fees and
include a number of additional limitations and requirements
(e.g., direct deposit of customers’ paychecks to ensure prompt
repayment) that consumers may find unattractive.36 Critics of
payday lending often attack such bank products as being too
costly.37
33. Wides, supra note 31, at 2.
34. See An Examination of the Availability of Credit for Consumers:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Robert W. Mooney, Dep.
Dir. for Consumer Prot. & Cmty. Affairs, FDIC) [hereinafter Mooney], available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/092211mooney.pdf
(“[A]
series of product and technological innovations and changes in the competitive
landscape in banking, among other factors, [have] contributed to a decline in the
number of banks offering small loans and an increase in alternative credit
providers, such as payday loan stores, auto title lenders, and pawn shops.”).
35. See G. MICHAEL FLORES, BRETTON-WOODS INC., 2009 FEE ANALYSIS OF
BANK AND CREDIT UNION NON-SUFFICIENT FUNDS AND OVERDRAFT PROTECTION
PROGRAMS 15 (2010), available at http://bretton-woods.com/media/3dba14
ccfd97117fffff82a5ffffd523.pdf (“Most banks are unlikely to meet this unmet
credit demand due to their cost structure to underwrite individual small credits.
Because of these constraints, many banks do not underwrite individual credits
under $5,000 and many will not offer individually underwritten unsecured loans
to customers.”).
36. See id. at 15–16 (explaining some limitations on bank payday-type
loans, including that “customers must have an account with a direct deposit for
a time period from one month to six months, in order to qualify”); see also
VICTOR STANGO, ARE CREDIT UNIONS VIABLE PROVIDERS OF SHORT-TERM CREDIT? 2
(2010), available at http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu/~vstango/Credit%20union
%20monograph.pdf (“The short-term loans offered by credit unions generally
carry greater restrictions on approval and repayment, meaning that riskadjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all.”).
37. See, e.g., SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 6, at 2 (“A number of other
alternatives are considerably cheaper than a traditional payday loan but fall
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Banks and credit unions continue to provide overdraft
services as their primary short-term credit offering.38 While such
overdraft programs generally are quite profitable for depositories,
they frequently are far more costly to consumers than payday
advances.39 This has been well documented in the FDIC’s Study
of Bank Overdraft Programs.40 This FDIC study showed, among
other things, that the median overdraft was $36, but the median
fee to cover overdrafts was $27.41 This has been further illustrated
by a 2011 study conducted by the Consumer Federation of
America, which found that overdraft fees of the fourteen largest
U.S. banks, when expressed in APR terms, ranged from 884% to
3,250%.42
The FDIC overdraft study also reported that a “significant
share of banks (24.7% of all surveyed banks and 53.7% of large
banks) batch processed overdraft transactions by size, from
largest to smallest, which can increase the number of
short of being a safe and affordable alternative. . . . Some credit union small
loans are admittedly better than a payday loan but are considerably too
expensive and have too short a repayment period.”).
38. See Patrick O’Shaughnessy, Advance America, Cash Advance Centers’
CEO Discusses Q3 2011 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct.
27, 2011 8:00 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/302813-advance-america-cashadvance-centers-ceo-discusses-q3-2011-results-earnings-call-transcript (last visited
Apr. 5, 2012) (“[M]ost banks and credit unions continue to provide overdraft services
and courtesy pay as their primary source of short-term credit to their customers.”) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. See David Sanford Jones, Payday Lending - A Better Alternative than
NSF/Overdraft Products: Analysis of 2009 Overdraft and Payday Loan
Analysis-Where is the Consumer Credit, G+ (Aug. 18, 2010), https://www.
gplus.com/mortgage-finance/insight/payday-lending-a-better-alternative-than-nsfoverdraft-products-50093 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“Bank NSF/Overdraft
protection fees are a more expensive form of short term credit extension to most
Americans. The lower cost Payday Loan is an attractive product, with more
accessibility and a proven track record.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
40. See FDIC, STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS ii (Nov. 2008)
[hereinafter FDIC STUDY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
overdraft/ FDIC138_Report_Final_v508.pdf (explaining that the results of the
study were intended to help “policymakers make better-informed policy
decisions and . . . help the public better understand the features and costs
related to automated overdraft programs”).
41. Id. at iii, v.
42. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMER., 2011 CFA SURVEY OF BIG BANK
OVERDRAFT LOAN FEES & TERMS 3 (2011) [hereinafter CFA], available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/OD-14BankSurvey-ChartAugust2011.pdf.
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overdrafts.”43 Moreover, a number of customers were heavy
repeat users of overdraft protection services.44 “Customers with
five or more NSF transactions accrued 93.4 percent of the total
reported NSF fees”;45 those “with 10 or more . . . accrued 84
percent of”46 these fees; and those “with 20 or more NSF
transactions accrued over 68 percent of the reported fees.”47 “The
FDIC issued guidance in November 2010 urging banks to ‘not
process transactions in a manner designed to maximize the cost
to consumers.’”48 In November 2011, Bank of America agreed to a
$410 million settlement with customers for processing account
transactions to make it more likely that they would incur
overdraft fees.49 Other banks, including Wells Fargo and
Citibank, face lawsuits related to their overdraft programs.50 An
analysis conducted by Pew Health Group’s Safe Checking in the
Electronic Age Project, examining more than 250 checking
accounts offered online by the ten largest banks in the United
States shared similar findings.51 According to Pew, the median
43. FDIC STUDY, supra note 40, at iii. Banks’ financial incentives for
processing overdrafts on a high-to-low basis are quite substantial. See Jeff
Horwitz, Union Bank Email Show Overdraft’s Seedy Underbelly, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_187/union-bankoverdraft-1042547-1.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“CAST Management
Consultants promised that by processing customers’ daily checking and debit
transactions based on the highest to the lowest dollar values, instead of in
chronological order, Union Bank could drastically increase how many
‘insufficient funds’ fees clients paid.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
44. FDIC STUDY, supra note 40, at iv. (“Although almost 75 percent of
consumer[s] . . . had no NSF transactions, . . . almost 12 percent of consumer . . .
had 1 to 4 NSF transactions, 5.0 percent had 5 to 9 NSF transactions, 4.0
percent had 10 to 19 NSF transactions, and 4.9 percent had 20 or more NSF
transactions.”).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Catherine New, Predatory Payment Processing Has Largely Stopped,
But Remains Legal, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:23 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/22/overdraft-fees-banks_n_1107985.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. Id.
50. See id. (“The Bank of America suit is just one of several pending
against banks, including related litigation against Wells Fargo and Citibank.”).
51. See PEW HEALTH GROUP, HIDDEN RISKS: THE CASE FOR SAFE &
TRANSPARENT CHECKING ACCOUNTS 1 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.
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overdraft penalty fee associated with these accounts was $35.52 If
applied to the median overdraft amount of $36 identified by the
FDIC “with a repayment period of seven days, the APR, or
annual percentage rate, on the typical overdraft would be over
5,000 percent—a costly way to address credit needs.”53 Pew’s
analysis also found that banks typically cap the number of
overdrafts per day that a customer may incur, but, given the
range of caps in place at major banks, customers could still “be
charged $140 or more per day in overdraft fees.”54
Furthermore, an analysis by Bretton Woods, Inc., a financial
services consulting firm, found that NSF and overdraft fees
charged by banks and credit unions in 2009 exceeded $38 billion
and had been “the single greatest component of bank and credit
union profitability for the past several years,” with such
programs generating an estimated 74% of banks’ service charge
income and 80% of credit unions’ fee income.55 This study found
that the average U.S. household with a banking account incurred
approximately thirteen NSF and overdraft fees in 2009 with an
annual cost per household of $376.56 But the 20 million
households that are particularly active users of these services
paid an average of $1,504 annually.57
Federal banking regulators have sought to limit banking
institutions’ overdraft charges, and regulatory changes adopted
in 2010 required consumers to opt-in to certain types of bank
overdraft programs.58 Moebs Services, Inc., an economic research
firm that conducts periodic studies of overdraft fees, recently
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Checking_in_the_
Electronic_Age/Pew_Report_HiddenRisks.pdf (explaining “five practices that
put consumers at financial risk, potentially exposing them to high costs for little
benefit”).
52. Id. at 2, 12.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id.
55. FLORES, supra note 35, at 11.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2010). Effective July 6, 2010, Regulation E requires
that bank and credit union customers to opt in to authorize debit card
overdrafts. Id. No opt-in is required in ATM transactions as long as the ATM
displays a notice allowing the consumer to opt out of the transaction if it would
incur an overdraft fee. Id.
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reported that despite federal regulators’ efforts to curtail feebased overdraft programs, which in 2010 had resulted in a
decline in consumer usage of overdrafts, the recent trend has
been a pronounced shift back to such programs as more
“consumers (77 percent of more than 130 million checking
accounts) have” voluntarily opted in to use this convenient but
expensive credit service.59
B. The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program
Federal regulators also have sought to encourage federally
insured banks to offer short-term, small-dollar loans that can be
an alternative, less expensive option to traditional payday loans
for financially challenged consumers.60 The FDIC has been
especially active in this regard and began a two-year pilot
program in early 2008 that was intended to show “how banks can
profitably offer affordable small-dollar loans as an alternative to
high-cost credit products, such as payday loans and fee-based
overdraft protection.”61 Loans in this program included what the
FDIC categorized as “small-dollar loans (SDLs) of $1,000 or less
and nearly small-dollar loans (NSDLs) between $1,000 and
$2,500.”62 SDLs averaged approximately $700, or about twice the
size of a typical payday advance, and NSDLs averaged
approximately $1,700.63 Initially, thirty-one banks participated in
the program, and twenty-eight were in this pilot project when it

59. Moebs Services, Overdraft Revenue Shown To Be Rising Like a Phoenix:
A Quarter of American Consumers Intentionally Overdraw Their Checking
Account, ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011, 8:33AM), http://eon.business
wire.com/news/eon/20110921005103/en/Moebs/Moebs-Services/Mike-Moebs (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See FDIC, A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot
Program, FDIC QUARTERLY, 2010, Volume 4, No. 2, at 28 (2010) [hereinafter
FDIC Pilot], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2010_
vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_SmallDollar.pdf (“The pilot was a case study
designed to illustrate how banks can profitably offer affordable small-dollar
loans as an alternative to high-cost credit products such as payday loans and
fee-based overdraft programs.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id.
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concluded in the fourth quarter of 2009.64 During the two-year
pilot, only 18,163 SDLs, totaling $12.4 million, and 16,294
NSDLs, totaling $27.8 million, were originated.65 Although
delinquency ratios for both loan categories were “much higher
than for general unsecured ‘loans to individuals,’” the FDIC
reported that charge-off ratios were “in line with the industry
average.”66
Based on the experience gained in this pilot effort, the FDIC
put forth a so-called “template” to demonstrate how other banks
might design and deliver products such as those offered during
the pilot program.67 This template is as follows68:
Table 1

It should be noted that this small-dollar loan template is called
“feasible” rather than “profitable.”69 While the FDIC has
64. Id. at 29
65. Id. at 30.
66. Id. at 31.
67. Id. at 28.
68. Id. at fig.1.
69. See id. at 30 (“The pilot resulted in a template of essential product
design and delivery elements for safe, affordable, and feasible small-dollar loans
that can be replicated by other banks.”).
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proclaimed the success of this pilot program, the agency’s
analysis of the program’s outcome essentially acknowledges that
the small-dollar loans offered were not shown to be profitable in a
normal commercial sense. Instead, these were touted as “a useful
business strategy for developing or retaining long-term
relationships with customers” and a means “to cross-sell
additional products.”70 The FDIC reported:
Program and product profitability calculation are not
standardized and are not tracked through regulatory
reporting. Profitability assessments can be highly subjective,
depending on a bank’s location, business model, product mix,
cost and revenue allocation philosophies, and many other
factors. Moreover, many of the banks in the pilot are
community banks that indicated they either cannot or choose
not to expend the resources to track profitability at the
product and program level.
Nevertheless, as a general guideline, pilot bankers indicated
that costs related to launching and marketing small-dollar
loan programs and originating and servicing small-dollar loans
are similar to other loans. However, given the small size of
SDLs and to a lesser extent NSDLs, the interest and fees
generated are not always sufficient to achieve robust shortterm profitability. Rather, most pilot bankers sought to
generate long-term profitability through volume and by using
small-dollar loans to cross-sell additional products.71

The FDIC is to be commended for seeking to promote lowercost, small-dollar loans. However, one must question whether
most bankers will adopt the FDIC’s view of profitability and be
willing to offer such loans under the terms of the “feasibility”
template and on a scale large enough to meet the credit needs of
the extremely large financially challenged market.72 When
70. Id. at 32. Participating banks also may have benefited from what may
be termed regulatory “goodwill” for offering smaller loans and also from
favorable Community Reinvestment Act consideration. Id.
71. Id.
72. Organizations representing the cash advance industry have found
considerable fault with the FDIC’s claimed successes under the pilot program.
See, e.g., FIN. SERV. CTRS. OF AM., INC., THE FDIC SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PILOT
PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY OF A MISGUIDED APPROACH TO SATISFYING CONSUMERS’
NEED FOR SMALL DOLLAR CREDIT (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.rtoon
line.com/images/fdicsdlcritique.pdf (stating that the FDIC has realized that “the
Guidelines it has promulgated are not conducive to a profitable small dollar loan
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considering the safety and soundness implications of banks
utilizing the template on a large scale, it would seem very
challenging, to say the least, to follow this model.
In any case, payday lenders like Advance America, whose
cost structures typically are significantly lower than federally
insured banks, have found it impossible to profitably make small
cash advance loans under a 36% APR cap as the FDIC advocates.
For example, under a 36% APR cap, a typical payday advance of
$300 would yield a total fee of $4.14. It would appear that no
lender—not a credit union, not a bank, and not a payday lender—
can make such loans to many customers for less than thirty cents
a day without subsidization or ceasing operations because of the
losses incurred on such loans. The following chart illustrates how
a lender would lose money under a 36% APR cap (which means a
lender could only charge a fee of $1.38 on a $100, two-week cash
advance), considering only a modest level of loan losses and
without any provision for operating expenses:
Table 2

Payday lenders have experienced these economic realities in
states where such caps have been imposed because they have not
been able to cover the cost of basic operating expenses, such as
wages, rent, and utilities, let alone the costs of loan losses.73 This
product”).
73. See, e.g., Emilie Ritter, Payday Lenders Close Operations in Montana,
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is precisely why industry opponents have advocated a 36% APR
cap on payday loans—they understand that it is in effect a loan
prohibition. For example, a representative of the Center for
Responsible Lending, which has led a campaign to prohibit
payday lending in various states, said that when Ohio
policymakers passed a 28% APR cap several years ago, they “fully
understood that [an APR cap] would ban the product . . . , [a]nd I
think, frankly, that was the intent.”74 Lenders in states that have
imposed such caps have been forced to close hundreds of loan
centers, costing thousands of employees their jobs and leaving
consumers with fewer, and in many cases far more expensive,
credit choices.75 Indeed, according to an Urban Institute study
conducted for the Treasury Department, prohibiting payday loans
is associated with just a 35% decline in the use of payday loans;
in states that have implemented such measures, consumers
instead use costlier, less regulated loans, such as Internet payday
loans, or travel across state lines to obtain short-term credit.76
It would be reasonable to conclude that this harsh economic
reality is why, two years after the pilot program began, the
number of banks offering such loans apparently has not
NPR (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/11/17/131378384/payday-lendersclose-operations-in-montana (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“There’s a new cap on
how much interest payday lenders in Montana may charge. Voters there
approved the measure earlier this month. Now, the payday loan industry says
hundreds of jobs will be lost.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. Drew Ruble, Borrowed Time?, BUSINESS TN, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 10.
75. See, e.g., Payday Loan Company Closing Oregon Stores: Check Into
Cash Blames Legislature’s New Law for Demise of Business, PORTLAND TRIBUNE
(Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.hp?story_id=1205
27663621387900 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“When the legislature passed the 36
percent limit the company closed many of its stores. No longer able to offer
payday loans, Check Into Cash tried to meet customer needs by offering check
cashing services and a new loan product, which weren’t popular.”) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. See SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN, CAROLINE RATCLIFFE, & DANIEL KUEHN,
URBAN INST., PROHIBITIONS, PRICE CAPS, AND DISCLOSURES: A LOOK AT STATE
POLICIES AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCT USE 22 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412306-Prohibitions-Price-Caps-and-Disclosures.
pdf; see also JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FED’N. OF AM., INTERNET
PAYDAY LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE
BORROWERS IN DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 4 (Nov. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Internet_Payday_Lending113004.
PDF (“Payday lending has expanded from check cashing outlets, pawn shops
and payday loan outlets to the Internet.”).
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expanded. At a September 2011 hearing before the House
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee, the
FDIC’s Deputy Director of Consumer Protection and Community
Affairs, Robert Mooney, said that twenty-six of the twenty-eight
banks participating in this FDIC Pilot continue to offer the loans
today.77 But he did not identify any instances in which the
lending was profitable, nor did he report that other banks are
offering small loans based on the “feasibility” template. Rather,
he said that the program allowed participating banks to develop
long-term customer relationships.78 He also commented in oral
remarks during the hearing that this was “the primary reason
they engaged in the program.”79 It stands to reason, though it
seems hard for industry critics to acknowledge, that if such loans
could be offered at a profit, more banks would already be doing
so—thus increasing competition with nondepository lenders for
financially challenged consumers’ short-term, small-dollar loan
business. In reality, while investing in relationships by offering
unprofitable loans may be justified in some instances, this does
not appear to be a viable strategy for effectively meeting the
needs of the tens of millions of financially fragile consumers.
Credit unions have also begun offering more short-term
credit options to their members.80 More than 500 credit unions
across the country offer such loans, which often are labeled as
payday advance alternatives and in some cases specifically are
termed payday loans.81 Administrators of these programs often
claim that they are less expensive than traditional payday loans
based on the comparative APRs of the services. However, while
credit unions may disclose a seemingly low APR, their loans often
involve additional membership, application, and loan origination
fees that are frequently hidden in the fine print of their loan
77. See Mooney, supra note 34, at 6. Elsewhere the FDIC has said that
thirty-one banks participated in this program and twenty-eight remained at the
end. FDIC Pilot, supra note 60, at 29.
78. See Mooney, supra note 34, at 5 (“[M]ost Pilot bankers indicated that
small-dollar loans were a useful business strategy for developing or retaining
long-term relationships with consumers.”).
79. Id. at 3.
80. See Ben Hallman, More Credit Unions Offering Payday Loans, WASH.
POST, May 31, 2011, at A08 (“[M]ore credit unions are competing directly with
traditional payday lenders, selling small, short-term loans.”).
81. Id.
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agreements.82 In one such example, a major credit union
advertises a 15% APR on its small-dollar, short-term loans, but
these loans also involve a $39.95 application fee and a $10 annual
membership fee, which, when included in the calculation, result
in an APR of over 350%.83 And, it should be noted that, as with
banks, credit unions’ main short-term credit offering is highercost overdraft services, which generally involve an approximately
$25 fee per overdraft, according to Moebs.84 Consumer advocates
have not necessarily supported all of these credit union
programs.85
The following chart, using data from Advance America, shows
the costs associated with comparable loan products based on a
fourteen-day loan:
Table 3

From the perspective of payday lenders, there is no objection to
innovative private sector programs that can provide consumers
with lower cost products through banks or other lenders to help
meet their short-term, small-dollar credit needs.86 Nor is there
82. Ben Hallman, Some Short-Term Loans Carry Equivalent Of 876%
Interest Rate, I WATCH NEWS (May 27, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.iwatch
news.org/2011/05/27/4754/credit-unions-remake-themselves-image-payday-lenders
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. Id.
84. Moebs Services, supra note 59.
85. See SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (“But payday loan alternatives
are not all created equal. Some are considerably more affordable and safer than
payday loans. Others differ little from the loans offered by traditional payday
lenders.”).
86. Governmental, nonprofit, and industry groups continue to explore new
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objection to government agencies like the FDIC encouraging such
programs, provided certain lenders’ products are not subsidized
by taxpayer dollars. Such an arrangement would result in unfair
competition with lenders that did not benefit from similar
subsidies. “Consumers thrive in a competitive, regulated financial
services environment.”87 But comparable short-term credit
options ought to be governed by similar regulations, including
uniform disclosure requirements, to ensure that consumers are
equipped with all of the information they need to compare
services. Such an approach would provide equitable treatment for
lenders without limiting valuable consumer choices.
IV. The Payday Loan Option
Although some banks and credit unions continue to explore
ways to offer lower cost, small-dollar credit products to financially
challenged consumers, Advance America sees no convincing
evidence that such efforts can be expected to help more than a
very small percentage of consumers who have urgent credit needs
today, tomorrow, and for the foreseeable future.88 Therefore,
public policy attention should be directed toward further
evaluating alternative credit choices available to these higher
credit risk consumers. Advance America believes that a more
realistic and objective analysis than has heretofore been made by
industry critics and some government officials shows that payday
loans provided by regulated lenders are a sensible and effective

and innovative ways to provide additional affordable small, short-term credit
options for financially challenged consumers. See, e.g., RACHEL SCHNEIDER &
MELISSA KOIDE, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVICES INNOVATION, HOW SHOULD WE SERVE THE
SHORT-TERM CREDIT NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS? 1 (Mar. 2010), available
at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/Research_Paper_Credit_Symposium_Mar25
2010_0.pdf (“This paper . . . discusses the demand for short-term credit and
examines credit products that hold potential to meet that demand.”).
87. Jamie Fulmer, Short-Term Lending Helpful, CFED (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:17
PM), http://blogs.cfed.org/cfed_news_clips/2011/09/shortterm-lending-helpful.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. Similarly, while credit counseling, consumer financial education,
savings, and always handling personal financial matters in responsible manner
should be strongly encouraged, it would seem unrealistic to expect that most
financially challenged consumers’ credit needs will be ended by such initiatives.
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means for many consumers to handle their short-term, smalldollar credit needs.
Data show that payday advances are often the least costly
credit alternative, and they provide financially challenged
consumers with a valuable financial management tool to avoid
experiencing worse financial problems, including facing the costs
and penalties of missing bill payments, submitting them late, or
resorting to unregulated loans.89
Payday advances are generally under $500 and normally due
on the borrower’s next payday.90 The average loan is between
$300 and $400, and the typical fee is $15 per $100 borrowed over
an average repayment period of two to four weeks.91 This is a
fixed, flat fee based on the total amount borrowed;92 interest is
not compounded and late fees are not charged.93 Millions of
consumers who are not able to or choose not to obtain credit
products from banking institutions select Advance America and
other regulated payday lenders to meet their periodic credit
needs.94 They report using the service to manage short-term cash
crunches such as unexpected expenses (e.g., medical costs, home
repairs, or car repairs), to prevent late fees on bills, to avoid
bouncing checks, and to help bridge a temporary reduction in
income. 95
The traditional storefront payday-advance industry
accounted for over 110 million loan transactions, amounting to
over $29.8 billion in credit extended, to approximately 19 million
consumers in 2011.96 Moreover, Advance America, for example,
89. See infra Part V, at fig.1.
90. See, e.g., GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, GEO. WASH. SCH. OF BUS., AN ANALYSIS
OF CONSUMERS’ USE OF PAYDAY LOANS vi (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.cfsaa.com/portals/0/RelatedContent/Attachments/GWUAnalysis_012009.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id. at 38.
94. See Advance America, Cash Advance, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.advanceamerica.net/apply-for-a-loan/faqs (last visited Apr. 5, 2012)
(“Since 1997, millions of customers have trusted Advance America to provide
convenient financial solutions to meet their needs.”) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
95. ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 90, at 42.
96. STEPHENS INC., PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY: INDUSTRY LOOKING MORE
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focuses primarily on providing cash advance service to middleincome working individuals.97 The following table shows selected
demographics of the customers which Advance America serves:
Table 498

Average Age (years)
Median household income
Percentage homeowners
Percentage with high school diplomas

Advance
America
Customers
42
$54, 373
48%
94%

U.S. Census
2010
39
$50,046
65%
85%

Advance America’s stores are located in population centers and
areas where customers live, work, and shop. These facilities are
professional, modern, and inviting. They are generally found in
high density retail areas within reputable shopping centers, and
they are often near large, nationally recognized anchors such as
well-known supermarkets, Walmart, Radio Shack, and other
chains with thousands of locations around the country.99 This is
done for the convenience of customers, who represent a broad
demographic segment and cannot be fairly grouped based on race,
sex, religion, or similar characteristics.
Further, payday customers are not the “unbanked,” as some
critics claim, because underwriting requirements for an advance
include a checking account and proof of employment or a steady
source of income. Two-thirds of Advance America’s customers
have at least one other financial option available to them that
ATTRACTIVE AS DEMAND EXPECTED TO INCREASE (2012).
97. A significant segment of middle-class Americans now essentially live
paycheck to paycheck and have limited abilities to meet unexpected expenses.
See Lusardi et al., supra note 18; NFCC, supra note 21.
98. This data is based on a survey by Advance America of approximately
385,000 of its randomly selected customers across all states that performed a
transaction between November 1, 2010, and October 31, 2011 [hereinafter
Advance America Customer Survey] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Internal research also suggests that Advance America’s customers
may have other financial options available to them that offer quick access to
money, and over half have major credit cards and overdraft protection on their
checking accounts.
99. Advance America Cash Advance, You Might Be Surprised What You
Learn, http://www.advanceamerica.net/surprised/about (last visited Apr. 5,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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offers quick access to money, and approximately half have major
credit cards and overdraft protection on their checking
accounts.100
Consumers find payday loans to be convenient and easy to
understand; they know precisely what they are getting and what
it is costing them.101 A payday loan is one of the most transparent
financial products on the market. The loan terms are simple, and
the fee is fully and prominently disclosed both as an implied APR
and as a dollar amount. Not surprisingly, according to Advance
America’s surveys and data, over 97% of customers are satisfied
with the company’s services.102 Our state regulators report very
few customer complaints (less than 50 such complaints were filed
with regulators out of over 10 million transactions in 2010).103
Repayment statistics demonstrate the affordability of payday
loans, as more than 90% of customers repay their loans on
time.104 Payday advances sometimes are mistaken for other forms
of short-term credit, but these services are distinct. For example,
car title or pawn shop loans require collateral or personal
property as security. Consumer installment loans offered by
nondepository lenders and, when available, by some insured
depositories typically involve larger dollar amounts and lengthier
repayment periods than payday advances, resulting in a higher
debt obligation and a longer-term commitment for consumers.105
100. Advance America Customer Survey, supra note 98.
101. The application process for a payday advance is straightforward and
transparent: the customer visits a lender center; provides identification, proof of
employment, and a bank statement; completes an application form; signs a
credit agreement; writes a check to the lender for the amount of the loan and
fee; makes an appointment to return and repay the advance; receives their cash
or check advance; and returns on the appointment date to repay the loan on
their next payday (usually in two to four weeks) and reclaims their check or may
simply have the check deposited.
102. Advance America Customer Survey, supra note 98.
103. This information is taken from the results of an Advance America 2010
survey of state regulators (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. Advance America Cash Advance, Myth vs. Fact: The Truth About Cash
Advances, http://www.advanceamerica.net/about-us/myth-vs-reality (last visited
Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See Larry Meyers, Payday Loans vs. Installment Loans, PAYDAY LOAN
FACTS (Jan. 2011), http://www.paydayloanfacts.com/blog/credit-options/paydayloans-vs-installment-loans/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (“Borrowers for this
product are in need of larger amounts than they obtain via a payday loan and
for a longer period.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In addition, regulated payday lenders offer customers less costly
loans than unregulated Internet lenders and extend more
consumer safeguards.106
The domestic cash-advance industry is subject to both state
and federal regulation.107 Payday advances are currently allowed
under the laws of thirty-one states.108 State laws typically limit
the principal amount of an advance, set maximum fees, provide
for minimum and maximum loan terms, limit a customer’s ability
to renew an advance, allow customers the right to rescind the
transaction before the end of the next business day, and require
various disclosures. Laws in many jurisdictions as well as the
payday advance industry’s self-imposed policies give borrowers
the right to repay their loan over an extended period of time,
without incurring additional fees, if they cannot pay as initially
promised.109 To enforce these provisions, state regulators
generally require lenders to meet specified licensing
requirements, file periodic written reports on business
operations, and undergo state audits and exams to ensure
compliance with applicable laws.110 State regulators also impose
106. See generally JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FED. OF
AMERICA, HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE BORROWERS IN
DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS: A CFA SURVEY OF INTERNET
PAYDAY LOAN SITES (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
CFAsurveyInternetPaydayLoanWebsites.pdf.
107. See ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 90, at 7–10; see also ADVANCE AMERICA,
REGULATED, TRANSPARENT CREDIT: SHORT-TERM LENDING GOVERNED BY
EXTENSIVE FEDERAL, STATE REGULATIONS, available at http://www.advance
america.net/documents/regulations.pdf.
108. Advance America is a founding member of the Community Financial
Services Association (CFSA), which is the payday advance industry’s leading
trade group. CFSA has taken a lead in advocating responsible state legislation
to regulate the industry and has also adopted a mandatory set of Best Practices
that must be followed by its members. Many of these Best Practices
requirements exceed what is required in some states’ laws. Among other things,
it requires that CFSA members offer customers who are unable to pay their loan
on time an extended payment plan that allows the loan to be repaid through a
series of smaller installments. See generally CFSA Member Best Practices,
CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS’N AM., http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See, e.g., 10 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-200-33 (2011) (“If an eligible borrower
elects an extended payment plan, a licensee shall permit the borrower to repay
the amount owed in at least four equal installments over a term of at least 60
days.”).
110. See, e.g., id. § 5-200-75 (listing the information that must be included
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fines or other penalties on payday lenders for failure to comply
with such laws.111 Additionally, lenders like Advance America do
not pursue criminal prosecution if a loan is not repaid, and
consumers’ credit ratings are not harmed if they are unable to
pay as agreed.
V. Weighing All Options
When financially challenged consumers are faced with
periodic unexpected or unplanned expenses—as everyone
certainly is—many first consider whether to obtain credit at all.
As part of this deliberation, they weigh the consequences of
disregarding their financial obligations, which can be
catastrophic. Those who do so can find that:
[Their immediate financial problem can] easily snowball out of
control and have serious consequences. Skipping the rent or
mortgage payment, and neglecting to pay credit cards or loans
will cause late fees to be added to the debt, putting negative
marks on the credit report, resulting in a lower credit score.
Well-meaning individuals who are already living on the
financial edge may never be able to catch up, exacerbating the
problem for months or years down the road.112

Most of these consumers ultimately decide obtaining credit is
the preferable option and seek to cope with their financial
shortfalls through an alternative credit product.113 Certainly,
payday loans are not their only option. A range of credit options
are available in today’s marketplace, and this variety of products
is appropriate.
by payday lenders in their required annual report).
111. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1828(B) (2011) (granting the Attorney
General, “[u]pon . . . referral by the [State Corporation] Commission,” authority
to seek, and Virginia circuit courts the authority to order, “damages
and such other relief allowed by law” for violations of Virginia payday lending
laws).
112. NFCC, supra note 21.
113. The term “alternative credit product” as used in this Article refers to
credit products other than unsecured, small, personal loans offered by insured
depository institutions and includes products offered by nondepository financial
services providers (such as small installment loans, payday loans, and pawn and
title loans) and fee-based products and services offered by depositories (such as
overdraft protection and credit card advances).
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Different alternatives appeal to these consumers for a variety
of reasons, and no single credit option is always the best in every
circumstance. Some may be able to borrow from family or friends,
but not everyone has this option, and many who do have this
option elect not to take it because they are embarrassed to do so.
A relative few may be able to get a suitable small personal loan
from a bank or credit union. Others may qualify for a somewhat
larger, longer term loan from a finance company or installment
lender, though such credit can expose them to a higher level of
debt and will likely involve significantly higher rates than those
offered to low-risk, more affluent customers.
In Advance America’s experience, many of our customers
typically weigh their credit options and select their lower cost
alternative. Others do not and simply select what they deem to be
the most convenient irrespective of the cost involved. For example,
millions of consumers utilize fee-based bank and credit union
overdraft protection programs extensively. Their check is covered
and the credit extension is made quite conveniently, but the fee for
doing so is generally significantly more costly than a payday
loan.114 Consumers who do compare the costs, as well as the
convenience, of their options will find that obtaining a payday
advance from a regulated lender is not only convenient but often
considerably less expensive than many competing alternatives
such as overdraft fees, credit card late fees, utility reconnect fees,
and NSF and merchant bad-check fees. The following chart
illustrates the relative costs of these alternatives:

114.

See CFA, supra note 42.
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Figure 1115

Given the costs of the likely available options, it is not
surprising that millions of consumers choose payday loans to help
them address their pressing credit needs. Advance America’s
belief, based on its extensive experience with its customers, is
that most select a cash advance because it is less costly than their
other likely available options, and they consider it affordable and
most suited to their needs. This is especially true when customers
need cash quickly to avoid high NSF, overdraft, and credit card
late fees, but it also applies in numerous other situations.
Customers are also often influenced to some extent by other
factors such as the convenience of being able to obtain a loan
promptly in an attractive location, on very understandable terms,
with limited simple paperwork, and during hours when other
credit sources may not be available. In short, while a payday loan
is not the best option for the consumer in some cases, in many
115. Data for this Figure are based on a typical payday advance fee
compared to the cost of alternative loan options. Costs for alternative loan
options have been derived from CFSAA.com, Stephens, Inc., the Moebs Services
2010 Fee Revenue Study, Bankrate.com, Readex Research National Data on
Short-Term Credit Alternatives 2006, and the Moebs Services 2010 Financial
Pricing Survey.
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others it is, and millions of consumers select it.
VI. Critics’ Favorite Attack: “Outrageous” Interest Rates and
Excessive Profits
Much of the concern over payday advances has been based on
consumer advocacy groups’ inflammatory allegations that payday
lenders are charging customers exorbitant interest rates, which
cause many people to believe lenders are making excessive
profits. From the perspective of the payday lending industry,
those who make such claims seriously mislead the public and
frequently do so intentionally. Payday advance lenders have no
doubt that their most vocal critics know that the fees charged for
small, short-term cash advances are reasonably priced and are
not generating extreme profits. However, these critics continually
allege lenders are charging outrageous rates, focusing on the
implied annual percentage rate disclosed by lenders, typically a
triple-digit number. Such an approach advances their political
agenda but misleads many people to immediately think
unconscionable fees are being charged.116
The misconception stems from a widespread misunderstanding
of how the fee charged for a payday advance translates into an APR.
The typical one-time, flat fee for a payday advance is $15 per $100
borrowed for a two-week period, which in most cases is the time
between customers’ paychecks.117 The total amount a customer will
repay for such a loan is $115; they will not pay any interest.
In other words, the stated APR of 391% for a two-week
payday advance is not an accurate representation of the cost of an
advance. It is an implied, theoretical annual rate for an advance,
116. Many in the consumer finance industry suspect that the real goal of
many advocacy groups that attack payday loans (and often other short-term,
small-dollar credit products) is to limit the availability of such products so much
that Congress would be forced to pass some type of credit subsidy plan to enable
certain lenders (e.g., credit unions) to offer below market rate loans on a mass
basis to financially challenged consumers because so many millions of these
voters would be desperate for credit availability.
117. InstantLoan, Rates, http://instantloan.net/rates.php (last visited Apr. 5,
2012) (“Traditional payday loans work by offering consumers a flat, one-time fee
for each $100 they take out. . . . Typical consumers pay between $15 and $18.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

PAYDAY LOAN PROHIBITIONS

1081

and it assumes that payday advances are extended twenty-six
times (every two weeks) during a year, with the customer paying
a new fee each time.
Table 5

This is a flawed assumption. Consumers generally utilize the
service for a relatively short period of time—weeks or months, not
years. Furthermore, virtually all state laws prohibit loans from
being extended twenty-six times; in fact, such rollovers typically
are either prohibited or limited by law to one or two times.118
Clearly, APR is a more suitable cost measurement of longer term
loans, such as mortgages or student loans, and can only be used
accurately to compare loans of the same or similar duration.
Critics describe the loan cost in terms of an APR, which
distorts the true cost of a payday loan because it makes it appear
that the lender is charging an actual interest rate of 391% or
more of the amount borrowed.119 The quick (but quite incorrect)
math for many people who are unfamiliar with payday loans and
APR calculations is that for a $100 loan for two weeks, a payday
lender would charge about $400. If this were true, the fee would
be totally unjustifiable and clearly unconscionable. Of course, this
is not the case.
The fact that the APR is not an accurate measurement of the
cost of short-term credit is widely recognized in the financial
services industry. For example, in testimony given in a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Financial Services
Committee, witnesses from the American Bankers Association
(ABA), the Credit Union National Association, and the
118. See, e.g., 10 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-200-35(B) (2011) (“If a borrower does
not obtain an extended payment plan or extended term loan in connection with
his fifth payday loan in 180 days, the borrower shall not be eligible for another
payday loan until 45 days after . . . the fifth payday loan is paid or otherwise
satisfied in full.”).
119. An APR calculation can provide a useful comparison tool when
evaluating the cost (fees, interest, and other charges) of longer term loans like
home mortgages, but Advance America believes that they are extremely
misleading when used for short-term, small-dollar loans.
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Independent Community Bankers of America, all noted this
fact.120 The ABA testimony, for example, explained:
Any time an annual percentage rate is calculated for a term
less than a year, the inclusion of a fixed fee, even a modest
one, will distort and overstate the APR. The shorter the
repayment period, the greater the APR will appear in
instances where there is a fixed fee. This means that the
sooner the consumer repays, the greater the calculated APR—
a difficult concept to explain to consumers, as it appears that
paying earlier actually increases the cost of credit.121

The following chart, based on a typical payday advance fee of
$15 per $100 borrowed, illustrates how the same fee of $15 for a
payday advance gives a dramatically different APR as the loan
term changes:
Figure 2

120. See H.R. 627, the Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009; and
H.R. 1456, the Consumer Overdraft Protection Fair Practices Act of 2009:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Institutions & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 84–106, 107–18, 118–25 (2009) (statement of
Kenneth J. Clayton, Senior Vice President/General Counsel, American Bankers
Association Card Policy Council; statement of Linda Echard, President and
CEO, ICBA Bancard, on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of
America; statement of Douglas Fecher, President and CEO, Wright–Patt Credit
Union, Inc., on behalf of the Credit Union National Association), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/111-17.pdf.
121. Id. at 105 (statement of Kenneth J. Clayton).

PAYDAY LOAN PROHIBITIONS

1083

It should be noted that although describing payday advance costs
in APR terms is politically advantageous to industry critics, these
figures are not very helpful to most customers, who find disclosure
of the fee as a dollar amount to be much clearer than the
confusing, “make-believe” APR figure.122
In summary, with respect to rates charged by payday lenders,
Advance America feels that critics’ emphasis on the implied APR
rates of cash advances is quite misleading.123 It usually causes
those who do not use payday loans and who have little
understanding of how such APRs are calculated to believe that
consumers are being charged incredibly and unjustifiably high
actual interest rates. This in turn results in many jumping to the
incorrect conclusion that lenders are making excessive profits. On
the other hand, consumers who use payday loans understand the
cost of the loan in terms of the actual fee charged (even though
many appear to be confused by and disregard the APR disclosure),
and payday lenders hear no outcry from customers themselves
that lenders are making unreasonable profits.
Specifically with regard to payday lenders’ profits, Advance
America’s data illustrate that it makes only reasonable profits,
which actually are considerably lower than many other businesses.
The company’s one-time fees for its cash advances are priced to
provide a fair profit after covering the costs of operating more than
2,500 brick-and-mortar loan centers as well as company overhead
expenses and the cost of loan losses that occur when some
122. See Edmiston, supra note 32, at 65. See generally THOMAS A. DURKIN,
HARV. JT. CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, SHOULD CONSUMER DISCLOSURES BE
UPDATED? (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-10_durkin.pdf (discussing history
and issues regarding APR calculations).
123. While Advance America believes that using APRs for short-term credit
products is inappropriate, to the extent that an APR calculation is required on
any such product it should be required on all such products and should be
calculated to include all credit costs. Currently, this is not the case. Banks and
credit unions, for example, are not required to disclose the cost of their fee-based
overdrafts in APR terms. Similarly, as more credit unions are offering payday
loan-like products, they are able to use an understated APR disclosure, which
does not include significant fees, that makes it appear their loans are much less
expensive than is in fact the case. It would be far clearer to consumers and
fairer for competing financial services providers if the total credit costs,
including all interest and fees, were required to be disclosed as a total dollar
amount and as a percentage of the total amount of credit extended.
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individuals do not repay their loans as agreed. The following
charts demonstrate that Advance America’s profits are clearly
reasonable and are well below those of many other corporations:
Table 6

Table 7
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Figure 3124

In addition to industry data such as that presented above,
third-party studies have confirmed that payday lenders are not
making excessive profits by charging unfair fees125:
This study finds that the industry’s proffered justifications for
high service fees, and by extension high APRs, may be justified
by both high store expenses and high loan losses. In addition,
this study finds that payday lender profit margins are less than
half that of their mainstream lending counterparts.
....
These figures indicate that payday lenders are not overly
profitable organizations. Contrary to conventional wisdom,

124. The information in this Figure is derived from each company’s publicly
available 2011 income statement, which can be found at AOL Daily Finance,
www.dailyfinance.com. The calculation used to arrive at these figures for stock
symbols AEA, PG, JPM, WFC, and MCD is (Net Income After Taxes ÷ Revenue)
x 100 = Net Profit Margin.
125. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do
the Costs Justify the Price? 21–22 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper
No. 2005-09, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp
2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf; see also ERNST & YOUNG, THE
COST OF PROVIDING PAYDAY LOANS IN A US MULTILINE OPERATOR ENVIRONMENT: A
STUDY PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTERS OF AMERICA 26–
27 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Resources/ForMediaPolicymakers/InformationKit/FiSCA_Final_09.03.09_Sent_
to_Client.pdf.
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these firms fall far short of profits for mainstream commercial
lenders. 126

It is also quite informative to consider the rate and profit issue
in the context of the 36% APR rate cap favored by industry critics
and the FDIC. This has been done by Stephens Inc., an
independent investment banking firm, as a part of its June 6, 2011
detailed analysis of the payday loan industry. Stephens gives the
following analysis using Advance America (AEA) data:
We looked at AEA’s cost structure as a proxy for the industry.
AEA’s store operating expenses, excluding loan loss provisions,
were approximately $138,000 per average store in FY10. In
addition, its corporate overhead and interest expense per
average store were about $26,000 and $1,900, respectively, for
the year. When adding all the costs together and dividing by 12,
the average monthly cost to operate a store is around $13,825,
which does not include loan losses. Therefore, if losses were zero
and assuming the average loan size at $350, AEA would need to
make approximately 3,150 loans a month just to break even at
36 percent APR. For the entire year of 2010, the average AEA
store wrote about 4,060 loans, or about 338 per month.
Our point of this exercise is to show that at 36 percent APR, it is
basically impossible for a storefront lender to make money
offering small dollar loans. Storefronts are there for the
customer’s convenience, but there are significant costs involved.
We could include banks in this discussion as well because they
would need to cover branch expenses. The reason the payday
loan industry originated to begin with was due to traditional
banks not making small loans to consumers because it became
unprofitable.127

VII. “Cycle of Debt” or “Important Debt Management Tool”?
The second overarching contention of the payday lending
industry’s critics is that payday advances cause consumers to sink
into a “cycle of debt” whereby they fall increasingly and hopelessly
behind in their financial obligations.128 In essence, they argue that
126. Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily
Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 227–28 (2007).
127. STEPHENS INC., PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY: INDUSTRY LOOKING MORE
ATTRACTIVE AS DEMAND EXPECTED TO INCREASE 23 (2012).
128. See, e.g., Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks
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financially challenged borrowers would be much better off in
dealing with their periodic short-term credit needs if payday loans
were prohibited.
Feedback from Advance America customers and supporting
data undermine this viewpoint, showing that it is not only
wrongheaded; it is patently contrary to reality, common sense, and
consumers’ best interests. Although some borrowers use payday
loans irresponsibly, just as some do with credit cards, overdrafts,
and other credit products, the overwhelming majority of cash
advance customers use their loans responsibly to manage their
financial obligations. Advance America customers report high
levels of satisfaction—recent customer feedback surveys found that
more than 90% of customers rated the service as good or excellent
and 93% said they would consider Advance America in the
future.129 Further, among more than 10 million transactions
nationwide, fewer than fifty Advance America customers filed
complaints with state agencies in 2010.130
These customers’ credit needs are immediate and cannot wait
for the development of other low-cost credit options at some later
point—these consumers need credit, and they need it today. It
must also be recognized that their need for supplemental credit is
often not an isolated occurrence. In many instances, they will need
to utilize payday loans or other small, short-term credit options
periodically over a number of months to manage their finances as
different needs arise. Thus, the present concern and focus should
be on ensuring they have access to as many regulated options for
managing their financial difficulties as possible, including payday
loans. As has been noted, traditional banks typically do not offer
such consumers affordable, unsecured, small personal loans. In
addition, the degree to which credit unions will be able to offer
lower cost, alternative payday loan products is uncertain. In any
case, such loans would not be available to the millions of
consumers who are not credit union members.131 And, while many
parties, including payday lenders, are seeking to find ways to
End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659 (2008), available at http://
usf.usfca.edu/law/academic/journals/lawreview/printissues/v42i3/SAN303.pdf.
129. Advance America Customer Survey, supra note 98.
130. Id.
131. See STANGO, supra note 36.
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lower loan costs and to develop innovative credit products, there is
no known realistic immediate or near-term scenario where
significantly less expensive new products will be available on a
large-scale, commercially viable basis. Indeed, a staff report from
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that “banning
payday loans is not, by itself, going to motivate competitors to
lower prices or invent new products.”132 Likewise, while credit
counseling and consumer financial education efforts can be helpful
and should be encouraged, consumer behavior on financial matters
cannot reasonably be expected to change significantly enough in
the immediate or near term to help but a small fraction of
financially challenged consumers secure significantly less costly
credit.
In this environment, Advance America and other regulated
payday lenders provide millions of consumers with a valuable
option—a product that is widely accessible, transparent,
affordable, and significantly less costly than the primary
alternatives.133 These are key reasons why consumers choose
payday advances and not other less favorable and more costly
alternatives. Consumers with limited credit choices are selecting,
more frequently than ever, one such less favorable option:
obtaining loans from unregulated offshore Internet lenders who
charge significantly higher fees than traditional payday lenders.
These foreign lenders operate illegally without complying with
state and federal consumer protection laws that are followed by
legitimate, domestic, regulated payday lenders.134
132. DONALD MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY
CREDIT BANS 27 (2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_
reports/sr309.pdf. This study concluded: “While our findings contradict the debt
trap/addiction hypothesis against payday lending, they are consistent with
alternative hypothesis that payday credit is cheaper than the bounce ‘protection’
that earns millions for credit unions and banks.” Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
133. When payday loans are not available, some consumers in certain
instances will be able to find a relatively inexpensive option (e.g., a low- or nocost small loan from a friend or family member), but in the vast majority of
cases the financially challenged consumer will be forced to choose a credit option
that is more costly than a payday loan and therefore more likely to make his or
her debt problems worse than would have been the case if the payday loan had
been available.
134. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Internet Payday
Lenders with Failing to Disclose Key Loan Terms and Using Abusive and
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The arguments of those who would “protect” financially
challenged consumers by denying them access to less costly payday
loans make no sense.135 Giving consumers fewer and more
expensive credit alternatives to choose from will clearly worsen
their financial situation, and those who are “teetering on the
brink” of personal financial disaster will be much more likely to be
“pushed over the edge.” As Donald Morgan of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York has noted:
While our findings contradict the debt trap/addiction hypothesis
against payday lending, they are consistent with alternative
hypothesis that payday credit is cheaper than the bounce
“protection” that earns millions for credit unions and banks.
Forcing households to replace costly credit with even costlier
credit is bound to make them worse off.136

By contrast, instead of “trapping” consumers, payday loans provide
most individuals with a temporary financial helping hand that
gives them a reasonable and affordable opportunity to manage a
short-term cash crunch while protecting their credit standing.137
Policymakers need to recognize this fact; as the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York’s Kelly Edmiston has pointed out:
Policymakers in many states have restricted the practice of
payday lending. Critics of the practice claim that payday
lenders take advantage of borrowers by charging exorbitant fees
and targeting at-risk populations. They also claim that payday
lending causes borrowers to fall into debt spirals, which create
unmanageable cycles of debt.
....
The evidence showed that consumers in low-income counties
may have limited access to credit in the absence of payday loan
options. As a result, they may be forced to seek more costly
Deceptive Collection Tactics (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2008/11/cashtoday.shtm.
135. See MORGAN & STRAIN, supra note 132, at 26 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 28.
137. Naturally, not all payday customers, despite their best efforts, will be
able to overcome their financial problems, but most do although it often takes
time to do so. About 90% repay their loans on time, but due to their continuing
underlying “financially fragile” situation, for a period of time they may well need
to obtain additional cash advances to meet either continuing or new expenses.
Providing such cash advances is clearly more “pro-consumer” than forcing them
to seek more costly credit elsewhere.
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sources of credit. The evidence also showed that, in counties
without access to payday lending, consumers have a lower
credit standing than consumers in counties with access.
The preponderance of evidence suggests that some consumers
will likely face adverse effects if payday lending is restricted.138

It is also important to point out that the total annual cost for
most customers using payday advances is relatively modest. A
typical customer who obtains an average loan of $400 for a fee of
$60 about eight times per year will only pay $480 (on a total
principal of $3,200) to meet his or her family’s year-long needs for
such supplemental credit. Yet for this modest cost industry critics
would deny customers this credit option and force them to seek
more expensive alternatives that will worsen their financial status.
More researchers now appear to be willing to remind critics
and policymakers that the benefits of payday lending must be
weighed in the ongoing public policy debate, which we believe has
all too often been skewed against our industry by biased, onesided, and paternalistic arguments. Increasingly, academic experts
are concluding what Advance America believes is the more
enlightened and correct view:
Lack of access to emergency funds can be detrimental to
consumers. For instance, every bounced check can incur
substantial fees and impose indirect costs. . . . Bouncing a check
may also result in termination of a bank account and even a
risk of criminal prosecution, while also damaging the
individual’s credit score, making subsequent access to credit
even more difficult.
Payday loan customers are not fools; they have carefully
weighed all of their options and chosen the best alternative they
can afford. Payday lending customers choose this financing
option over an array of relatively unattractive options, such as
pawn shops, bank overdraft protection, credit card cash
advances (where available), and informal lenders or loan
sharks. For instance, according to a study by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, a customer repaying a $20 debit
overdraft in two weeks would incur an average Annual
Percentage Risk (APR) of 3,520 percent . . . .
....

138.

Edmiston, supra note 32, at 83.

PAYDAY LOAN PROHIBITIONS

1091

Misguided paternalistic regulation that deprives consumers of
access to payday loans is likely to force many of them to turn to
even more expensive lenders or to do without emergency
funds.139

VIII. Conclusion
In our nation’s current economic environment, the need for
affordable short-term credit is not abating. Indeed, as economic
uncertainty and regulatory efforts evolve, the need for such credit is
growing as an unprecedented number of Americans are living
paycheck to paycheck. Reliable access to credit allows them to
manage unexpected or unplanned expenses when they arise.
While some banks and credit unions have begun to offer shortterm loans or account advances, most banking institutions do not
offer short-term, small-dollar, unsecured personal loans, and many
financially challenged consumers cannot qualify for other traditional
forms of credit because of their credit records. The short-term bank
and credit union programs that do exist are often inaccessible to such
consumers due to the various fees and conditions of these services.
Despite attempts by regulators and other parties to encourage these
institutions to offer such loans at no more than 36% APR, it does not
appear that banks can be expected to do so to any significant degree
because making the loan would not be profitable. And various other
efforts to develop innovative credit programs that can meet these
consumers’ needs have shown little or no progress.
Existing credit options, therefore, ought to be preserved, not
reduced. Regulators, consumer groups, and leaders within the
financial services industry must foster the development of services
that serve the full breadth of American consumers. One possible
solution may be to establish a framework that enables bank and
nonbank entities to collaborate on creating a short-term credit
continuum. This would facilitate consumers’ seamless movement
through various credit products and services as appropriate to their
specific financial needs and unique situations. Additionally, this
arrangement would help migrate higher risk customers from higher
139. TODD ZYWICKI & ASTRID ARCA, MERCATUS POLICY CTR., THE CASE
AGAINST NEW RESTRICTIONS ON PAYDAY LENDING 2 (No. 64, Jan. 2010) (citation
omitted), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/MOP64_
FMWG_Payday%20Lending_web.pdf.
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cost products to prime or near-prime products based on actual
repayment experience; it would also combine bank-insured status,
which allows providers to offer higher dollar products such as
mortgages and business loans, with a nonbank consumer focus,
resulting in an innovative product mix.
Such a system would allow unbanked consumers who currently
use alternative financial services to move into a mainstream bank or
credit union and would allow nondepository lenders to offer more
traditional services to accommodate those who prefer nonbank
financial services. This system could also help to spur the
development of neighborhood financial services centers that would
offer check cashing, money transfer, microcredit loans, and prepaid
debit cards, along with other secured and unsecured traditional bank
products, which would leverage the physical plant cost structure of
nonbanks and the cost-of-capital insured status of banks.
In the absence of further innovation, however, financially
challenged consumers must still have a variety of credit options
available to them, including payday loans. And they deserve a
regulatory framework that balances access to credit alternatives with
affordability—one that enables consumers to compare financial
services and to evaluate them based on the associated costs and
consequences. Roughly 19 million consumers obtained payday loans
from regulated lenders last year. They benefited from having access
to an affordable, cost-competitive, and transparent service—one that
is valued by the vast majority of customers. Payday loans provide
many consumers with a simple, effective, and affordable means of
managing short-term financial difficulties and allow them the chance
to work through their problems.
If industry critics succeeded in eliminating payday loans,
consumers would be forced to choose less regulated or more expensive
credit options or, in some instances, may not be able to obtain credit
at all. They may fall behind on bills and other payments, leading to
additional fees and penalties or causing the loss of personal property.
Consumers do not benefit from such a scenario.
Consumers should be smart about their money and savings. Any
form of credit can be abused. But it is time for policymakers and other
interested parties to acknowledge that, for millions of financially
challenged Americans, payday loans are a sound choice and an
effective financial tool for managing short-term financial needs.

